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“SALT” IN THE WOUND? MAKING A CASE AND 
FORMULATING A REMEDY WHEN AN 
EMPLOYER REFUSES TO HIRE UNION 
ORGANIZERS 
Unions want access to nonunion employees in order to gain their 
loyalty and unionize the employer’s business.1 Employers, conversely, 
want to restrict a union’s access to their nonunion employees.2 In the battle 
for the loyalty of nonunion employees, employers appear to be winning, 
because union membership continues to decline in America.3 As a result of 
this decline, unions have become increasingly creative in their attempts to 
reach nonunion employees. One tactic unions have employed involves 
sending paid and unpaid organizers to apply for jobs with nonunion 
employers4 for the purpose of attempting to unionize the employer’s 
workforce.5 This practice is known as “salting.”6 
 1. A union’s right to access nonunion employees has been debated for decades. See, e.g., 
Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, 96 N.L.R.B. 608, 613 (1951), enforcement denied on other grounds, 197 
F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952) (holding that when an employer addresses nonunion employees on company 
time, union should have same opportunity to address employees). For examples of the debate 
concerning the availability of nonunion employees to union organizers, see William B. Gould, The 
Question of Union Activity on Company Property, 18 VAND. L. REV. 73 (1964); Jay Gresham, Note, 
Still as Strangers: Nonemployee Union Organizers on Private Commercial Property, 62 TEX. L. REV. 
111 (1983). 
 2. There is a wide body of case law concerning employers’ efforts to limit union contact with 
their employees. See, e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992) (holding that employer had a 
right to restrict distribution of union literature by nonemployee organizers where employer sought to 
prevent organizers from entering company property); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 
793, 803 & n.10 (1945) (upholding employer’s right to restrict nonunion employees from soliciting 
coworkers on company time).  
 3. In 2001, 13.5% of wage and salary workers were union members. BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR UNION MEMBERS SUMMARY, Jan. 2002, available at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.html. This equates to 16.3 million workers. Id. The union 
membership rate has continuously fallen from 20.1% of the working population in 1983, the first year 
for which comparable union data are available, to its current rate. Id. The steadiness of membership 
rates in the public sector, particularly protective service workers, like police officers and firefighters, 
has marginally offset the overall decline in unionization. Id. The unionization rate of government 
workers in 2001 was 37.4%, while unionization in the private sector was considerably lower at 9%. Id.  
 4. See NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 87 (1995) (describing union 
members applying for jobs with a nonunion employer). For a discussion of union tactics in organizing, 
see Michael Ballot, New Directions in Union Organizing, 45 LAB. L.J. 779 (1994).  
 5. See Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. at 88. The Court noted that the union members intended 
to try to organize the company if they secured jobs. Id. See also James L. Fox, “Salting” the 
Construction Industry, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 681, 683 (1998) (describing the organizer’s goal of 
getting hired in order to engage in organizing activity).  
 
 
201 
 6. The term “salting” appears to originate from the concept of “salting” a mine, where metal or 
ore is introduced into a mine to create a false impression that the substance is actually in the mine. Id. 
at 682. It may also relate to the phrase “salting the books,” where books of account are falsified. See 
Tualatin Elec., Inc., 312 N.L.R.B. 129, 130 n.3 (1993). See also R. Wayne Estes & Andrea E. Joseph, 
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Historically, the infiltrating union organizers, known as “salts,” hid 
their motives when applying for jobs with nonunion employers.7 If an 
employer discovered that an applicant or employee was a union organizer, 
the employer usually responded by refusing to hire or subsequently 
discharging the organizer.8 Once unions lost this kind of insider access to 
the nonunion employees, their ability to organize the workforce decreased 
significantly.9  
The necessity for surreptitiously using salting as an organizing tool 
ended in 1995 when the Supreme Court extended to salts the statutory 
protection against discrimination provided to other “employees”10 in 
NLRB v. Town & Country Electric.11 In Town & Country, the Supreme 
Court held that paid and unpaid organizers were “employees” like any 
other job applicant, thus deserving protection from discrimination under 
the National Labor Relations Act12 (NLRA). This protection has 
emboldened union organizers to inform employers of their organizer status 
either verbally or in writing on the job application.13 Unions use this 
Missing Analytical Link in Supreme Court’s “Salting” Decision Disturbs Balance of Union-
Management Rights: A Critical Analysis of NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, 30 IND. L. REV. 445, 
446 (1997) (citing Sullivan Elec. Co., 1995 NLRB LEXIS 82 at *4, *5) (comparing the fraudulent 
scheme of salting a mine to the union’s practice of getting people into jobs who are not really 
interested in employment).  
 7. “Salts” would not advertise their union status because, prior to the decision in Town & 
Country, some courts held that nonunion employers could deny jobs to applicants simply because of 
their union affiliation. See, e.g., H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70, 72-73 (4th Cir. 1989) 
(denying union’s argument that union applicants should receive the same protections received by other 
applicants). See also infra note 28.  
 8. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 161 F.3d 953, 958 (6th Cir. 1998) (describing 
termination of employee who was affiliated with union and refused to cross picket line); Ultrasystems 
W. Constr., Inc. v. NLRB, 18 F.3d 251, 253 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting employer was aware of salts’ 
unionizing effort and did not hire any of sixty-six applicants for its open positions). While the National 
Labor Relations Board sought to protect these workers, see infra note 27, unions could not count on 
the courts of appleals’ support to protect their organizers when they applied for jobs. See, e.g., Zachry, 
886 F.2d at 73 (holding that union organizers are not “employees” covered by the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) because they are loyal to the union, not the employer).  
 9. Refusing to hire union sympathizers is an effective tool for employers in preventing union 
organization. See generally William N. Cooke, The Rising Toll of Discrimination Against Union 
Activists, 24 INDUS. REL. 421 (1985).  
 10. The Supreme Court had already extended protection to applicants for employment in Phelps 
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).  
 11. 516 U.S. 85 (1995). 
 12. Id. at 87. The pertinent language from the National Labor Relations Act is as follows: “The 
term ‘employee’ shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular 
employer . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000). 
 13. For an example of salts notifying employers of their organizer status, see NLRB v. Fluor 
Daniel, Inc., 161 F.3d 953, 956 (6th Cir. 1998) (noting that applicants wrote “voluntary union 
organizer” or similar words on job applications). The practice of salting is particularly pervasive in the 
construction sector. See Northup, infra note 14. The construction industry is one of the few private-
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disclosure as a challenge to employers either hire organizers and allow 
them to attempt to organize the workforce, or not to hire the organizers 
and face the possibility of violating the NLRA.14 If an employer does not 
hire the organizers, the union can file a charge with its local branch of the 
National Labor Relations Board (the Board), anticipating that the General 
Counsel for the Board (the General Counsel) will in turn file an unfair 
labor practice charge against the employer on the union’s behalf.15 The 
Board and, if a decision is appealed, the federal courts of appeals, have 
jurisdiction to determine if the General Counsel proved that the employer 
actually refused to hire the union organizers based on their status, which 
would be impermissible under the NLRA.16 
The General Counsel’s decision to file unfair labor practice charges 
depends upon his ability to establish a prima facie case for refusal to hire. 
The elements of this prima facie case have evolved over time at the 
Board’s direction.17 Initially, the Board held that the General Counsel 
established a prima facie case by showing that the employer expressed 
antiunion animus and generally refused to hire union adherents.18 
sector areas that witnessed higher-than-average unionization rates at 18.4%—in 2001. See supra note 
3.  
 14. Several commentators argue that unions attempt to put employers in a no-win situation by 
either forcing an employer to hire salts or initiating unfair labor practice charges against an employer 
who does not hire salts. See, e.g., John A. Litwinski, Regulation of Labor Market Monopsony, 22 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 49, 80 (2001) (arguing that unions engage in salting in order to raise 
nonunion employers’ costs and thereby encourage unionization); Herbert R. Northrup, “Salting” the 
Contractors’ Labor Force: Construction Unions Organizing with NLRB Assistance, 14 J. LAB. RES. 
469 (1993).  
 15. Under these circumstances, the National Labor Relations Board (Board), through its General 
Counsel, charges an employer with violating section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, which provides that “it shall 
be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of 
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any 
labor organization . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2000). 
 16. Refusing to hire a union organizer solely because of his status is impermissible under section 
8(a)(3) of the NLRA. See supra note 15. See also Ultrasystems W. Constr., Inc. v. NLRB, 18 F.3d 251 
(4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a refusal to hire applicants because of union affiliation violated Section 8 
of the NLRA). 
 17. See Part II of this Note for a discussion of the evolution of the prima facie case under the 
NLRA. Generally, a prima facie case is “[a] party’s production of enough evidence to allow the fact-
trier to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party’s favor.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1209 (7th ed. 
1999). In making a prima facie case, a plaintiff must allege certain elements. The Supreme Court has 
explained that a prima facie case “not only may denote the establishment of a legally mandatory, 
rebuttable presumption, but also may be used by courts to describe the plaintiff’s burden of producing 
enough evidence to permit the trier of fact to infer the fact at issue.” Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981) (citing 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2494 (3d ed. 1940)). 
 18. See Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. NLRB, 967 F.2d 624, 627-28 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (upholding 
Board’s determination that display of antiunion animus was so pervasive during employer hiring that 
all applicants were discriminated against).  
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Recently, however, the Board has modified its approach and now requires 
that the General Counsel show a connection between an applicant and a 
specific job opening at the time of the alleged discrimination, in addition 
to showing antiunion animus.19 While the Board now requires more 
evidence from the General Counsel,20 the courts of appeals have not yet 
examined the Board’s new approach,21 and the Supreme Court has not 
spoken on the issue. The Board’s recent modification of the prima facie 
case requirements better comport with prior courts of appeals holdings 
than the earlier tests.22 However, the Board’s approach would better 
withstand future scrutiny if, in addition to showing antiunion animus, the 
General Counsel had to match job openings to candidates in order to make 
a prima facie case for refusal to hire.23 Job matching would ensure that 
only those applicants who are actually qualified for a position, and thus 
legitimate victims of discrimination, are protected under the NLRA.24 
Part I of this Note examines discrimination in hiring in the salting 
context from its recognition by the Board in 1975 until today. Part II 
examines how the Board makes a prima facie case of discrimination in 
hiring under the NLRA. Part III compares discrimination in hiring in the 
NLRA context to the similar Title VII context. Part IV examines four 
courts of appeals’ applications of the Board’s evolving test to their cases. 
Finally, Part V of this Note explains why the best approach to determining 
discrimination in hiring is to require the General Counsel to match job 
openings to specific candidates, as well as to show evidence of antiunion 
animus in order to make a prima facie case for discrimination in hiring 
under the NLRA, and to tailor a remedy that only addresses the applicants 
who were discriminated against.  
 19. The Board announced a new rule for making a prima facie case in FES (A Division of 
Thermo Power) 331 N.L.R.B. (2000), aff’d 301 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 2002). The Board required its General 
Counsel to show that at least one applicant was not hired for a specific job because of discrimination. 
Id. at 14.  
 20. See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. 
 21. The Board instituted its most recent test in 2000, and the Third Circuit, the only court of 
appeals to date to apply the new test, did not comment on it in its opinion. See FES, 301 F.3d at 87. 
 22. The Board’s most recent test was adopted from the Seventh Circuit’s rationale in Starcon, 
Inc. v. NLRB, 176 F.3d 948, 951 (7th Cir. 1999), and is consistent with Ultrasystems, 18 F.3d at 256. 
See also infra note 78.  
 23. See infra Part V. 
 24. See infra note 169 and accompanying text. 
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I. SALTING AND DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING: A HISTORY 
Unions developed salting as a way to gain access to employees of 
nonunionized companies and to organize their workforces.25 Prior to 1975, 
because the courts did not yet protect the practice of salting26 and the 
Board did not yet recognize the practice,27 salts could not identify 
themselves as such because a prospective employer could, and would, 
refuse to hire them without facing the threat of an unfair labor practice 
charge.28 Under the structure of the NLRA, when a union believes that an 
employer has committed an unfair labor practice in violation of the 
NLRA, it files a charge with the Board requesting that the Board’s counsel 
file an unfair labor practice charge against the employer on its behalf.29 In 
the first stage of inquiry, the Board’s local counsel reviews the union’s 
complaint to determine whether there is evidence to show that the 
employer has committed an unfair labor practice.30 If the Board’s counsel 
at the Regional Office believes the employer has committed an unfair 
labor practice, he attempts settlement with the employer.31 In the majority 
of cases, the employer settles with the Board at the Regional Office 
level.32 If, however, the matter is not settled, the Board’s counsel files a 
 25. See Note, Organizing Worth Its Salt: The Protected Status of Paid Union Organizers, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 1341 (1995). One of the reasons for the growth of the practice of salting is the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. at 541, in which the Court held that 
employers can prevent union organizers from approaching employees on the employer’s property. 
When the avenue of nonemployee soliciting was closed by the Lechmere decision, unions had to find 
alternate means of reaching nonunion employees. Organizing Worth Its Salt, supra, at 1341. 
 26. Courts did not uniformly protect salting until the Supreme Court’s decision in Town & 
Country, 516 U.S. at 90-92. 
 27. The Board first recognized salting in 1975 in Oak Apparel, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 701, 701 
(1975). 
 28. See Town & Country Elec. v. NLRB, 34 F.3d 625, 628-29 (8th Cir. 1994), vacated by, 516 
U.S. 85 (1995); H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70, 72-73 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that union 
organizers are not an employer’s prospective “employees” under the Act because they are already 
employed by their unions); NLRB v. Elias Bros. Big Boy, Inc., 327 F.2d 421 (6th Cir. 1964) (holding 
that union organizer was not bona fide employee).  
 29. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)(2000). The union files the charge at one of the Board’s Regional Offices, 
where the initial investigation is conducted. See infra note 30. These regional offices are supervised by 
the General Counsel, who is independent of the Board itself and ultimately decides which cases are 
prosecuted. When a case is prosecuted, it is heard by an administrative law judge at the regional level 
and can be appealed to the Board for final agency determination. See infra note 32. 
 30. The Board’s Counsel at the Regional Office level collects evidence and interviews 
employees, union members, and the employer involved in order to make a finding. See generally S. 
STRAUS & J. HIGGINS, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 
BOARD (5th ed. 1996). 
 31. See STRAUS & HIGGINS, supra note 30.  
 32. Generally, one-third of the approximately 35,000 unfair labor practice cases filed annually 
are found to have merit, and 90% are settled at the Regional Office level. NATIONAL LABOR 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p201 Howlett note.doc 5/8/03   1:29 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
206 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 81:201 
 
 
 
 
 
complaint against the employer. Assuming that the General Counsel for 
the Board in Washington, D.C., agrees to pursue the case, an 
administrative law judge will be appointed to hear the case.33 If either 
party appeals the administrative law judge’s decision, a three-member 
panel or the full five-member Board in Washington, D.C., will have the 
discretion to hear the case and enter its decision.34 If the Board rules in 
favor of the union, the Board will then order the appropriate remedy to 
cure the unfair labor practice.35 Either the union or the employer can 
appeal the Board’s final decision directly to the federal court of appeals if 
it disagrees with the order or if it needs the help of the federal court to 
enforce the order against the losing party.36 After the court of appeals 
decides the case, the only remaining recourse for a losing party is to seek 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.37  
The Board first addressed salting in Oak Apparel Inc. in 1975.38 In Oak 
Apparel, the Board recognized salting by holding that organizers, 
including those who were only seeking temporary employment, were still 
“employees” deserving coverage under the NLRA.39 In spite of the 
Board’s holding, courts of appeals did not uniformly accept salting as a 
protected activity, and, as a result, case law on the issue did not develop 
quickly.40  
The Supreme Court ultimately extended the protection enjoyed by 
employees and applicants under the NLRA to salts in its 1995 decision in 
RELATIONS BOARD, FACT SHEET ON THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/facts.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2003). 
 33. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (2000). See also supra note 30.  
 34. Id. 
 35. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2000). 
 36. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (2000). Courts of appeals must accept the Board’s findings of fact “if 
supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Id. The Supreme Court 
indicated that the Board is due deference because it is “one of those agencies presumably equipped or 
informed by experience to deal with a specialized field of knowledge, whose findings within that field 
carry the authority of an expertness which courts do not possess and therefore must respect.” Universal 
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). The Board has the authority to make law through 
either adjudication or rulemaking, but generally does so through adjudication. See Edward Silver & 
Joan McAvoy, The National Labor Relations Act at the Crossroads, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 181, 196-
99 (1987).  
 37. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The United States Supreme Court has appellate power over “the 
Laws of the United States,” of which the NLRA is included. Id.  
 38. 218 N.L.R.B. at 701 (1975) (holding that paid union organizers are “employees” deserving 
protection under the National Labor Relations Act).  
 39. Id.  
 40. The Board did not again address salting until Sunland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224 
(1992), and Town & Country Elec., Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 1250 (1992), enforcement denied 34 F.3d 625 
(8th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 513 U.S. 1125 (1995), and vacated, 516 U.S. 85 (1995), where the 
Supreme Court ultimately recognized salting as a protected activity.  
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NLRB v. Town & Country Electric,41 ending twenty years of uncertainty 
regarding the rights of organizers.42 Since this decision, unions, 
particularly in the construction industry,43 have felt strengthened by the 
new protection, and have begun to order their organizers to advertise their 
status as such in their job applications.44 As a result of this protection for 
organizers, employers are exposed to a union threat in either of two ways. 
If the applicants are hired, they engage in unionizing activity.45 If the 
applicants are not hired, the union can file an unfair labor practice 
complaint with the Board.46 Generally, if the Board finds that an employer 
has committed an unfair labor practice, it will order a remedy in the 
compliance stage that requires the employer to cease and desist its 
discriminatory activity and to offer employment with back pay to certain 
individuals who suffered discrimination in hiring.47  
 41. Supra note 4.  
 42. Compare Willmar Elec. Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d 1327, 1330-31 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 
(holding that paid union organizers were protected under the NLRA), with H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 
886 F.2d 70, 72-73 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that paid union organizers are not truly in search of a job 
and act under instructions from their union).  
 43. For a discussion of salting in the construction sector, see Northrup, supra note 14. Northrup 
argues that the goal of unions is either to organize the work force or precipitate an unfair labor practice 
proceeding that will be costly to the employer and weaken its ability to fight the union. Id. at 472-73. 
See also Kathleen Scheil Scheidt, National Labor Relations Board v. Town & Country Electric, Inc.: 
Allowing a Trojan Horse to Trample Employer Rights, 24 J. CORP. L. 89 (1998).  
 44. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. NLRB, 127 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(recounting that salts gave employer a letter identifying themselves as union organizers and 
announcing their intent to organize workers at the job site); and NLRB v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 161 F.3d 
953, 956 (6th Cir. 1998) (noting that union organizers wrote “voluntary union organizer” on job 
applications).  
 45. See, e.g., Douglas Foods Corp. v. NLRB, 251 F.3d 1056, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (describing 
employees’ attempts to organize by passing out union cards and asking coworkers to sign them).  
 46. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 127 F.3d at 1308-09 (upholding unfair labor practice 
determination when employer failed to hire known union organizers and union responded by filing 
unfair labor practice charge).  
 
 47. See, e.g., Eckert Fire Prot., Inc., 332 N.L.R.B. No. 18, 2000-2001 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 
¶ 15.617 (Sept. 21, 2000) (holding that where employer refused to hire applicants because they were 
union organizers, remedy included cease and desist order and order to offer employment to those 
discriminated against with back pay). The remedy for refusal-to-hire cases has been as inconsistent as 
the finding of discrimination itself, as seen by the wide variation in orders to hire entered by the Board 
and the courts of appeals. See infra Part IV. In recent cases, the Board appears to be seeking to invoke 
some consistency into the remedy formula that would more likely be upheld by courts of appeals. In 
light of courts’ views of the Board’s test in NLRB v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 161 F.3d 953, 966-71 (6th Cir. 
1998) (refusing to uphold Board’s order that all “salt” applicants be offered employment in the original 
or substantially similar positions where there may have been more applicants than jobs) and Starcon, 
Inc., v. NLRB, 176 F.3d 948, 951-52 (7th Cir. 1999) (overturning Board order to offer positions to all 
union-organizer applicants where there were substantially fewer available jobs than applicants), the 
Board announced a new test in FES, supra note 19, at 14 (outlining new test where General Counsel 
“must show there were openings for the applicants” to receive an affirmative back pay and instatement 
order). The risk to employers was particularly high if the Board ordered instatement with back pay as a 
remedy. See Eckert, Fluor Daniel, Starcon, and FES, supra. 
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II. HOW DOES THE NLRB MAKE A PRIMA FACIE CASE THAT AN 
EMPLOYER HAS COMMITTED DISCRIMINATION IN FAILING TO HIRE 
SALTS?  
A. The Original “In-Part” Test 
The Board found it difficult to formulate a test for discrimination in 
hiring when evaluating a union’s charge that an employer had committed 
an unfair labor practice.48 The Board initially looked to discriminatory 
discharge case law for guidance, because case law in the discharge context 
had already been developed both by the Board and by courts.49 If an 
employer discharged an employee because of his status as a union 
organizer, the Board determined that it had committed an unfair labor 
practice by interfering in the employee’s “right to self-organization.”50  
The Board struggled to determine the employer’s motive because an 
employer could allege something other than union organizing activity as 
the reason for discharge.51 If an employer has an improper motive for 
discharging an employee, its alleged legitimate nondiscriminatory reason 
falls into one of two categories. The alleged reason is either a pretext, 
which is a clear violation of the NLRA, or a combination of permissible 
and impermissible motives, which is called “mixed” or “dual motive.”52 
Mixed-motive cases were particularly difficult to address because the 
Board had to sift through permissible and impermissible motives to assess 
whether an unfair labor practice had indeed been committed.53 In light of 
 48. This difficulty can be seen by the change in the test’s formulation from the 1992 Great Lakes 
decision as upheld by the D.C. Court of Appeals until the most recent test announced in FES. See 
Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. NLRB, 967 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1992); FES, 331 NLRB No. 22.  
 49. The Board addressed discriminatory discharge as long ago as 1952. See Connecticut Chem. 
Research Corp., 98 N.L.R.B. 160, 162 (1952) (ordering employer to cease and desist discriminatory 
activities and reinstate employees discriminatorily discharged).  
 50. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000). 
 51. See, e.g., W.C. McQuaide, Inc. v. NLRB, 133 F.3d 47, 49-50 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (remanding 
case to Board after acknowledging evidentiary conflict between employer’s and employees’ reason for 
termination); In re Carolina Mills, Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 1141, 1140-43 (1951) (overturning an 
administrative law judge determination that employee was fired because of union activity by finding 
employer discharged employee because of her poor productivity). There are two ways the employer’s 
proffered explanation can be improper: either the employer was lying about its legitimate purpose, and 
actually acted under “pretext;” or the employer had a combination of permissible and impermissible 
motives that it acted upon, which is called a “mixed” or “dual” motive. See infra note 106 for a 
discussion of pretext and infra note 52 concerning mixed motive cases. 
 52. For a discussion of the history of mixed or dual motive issues under the NLRA, see Leona 
Green, Mixed Motives and After-Acquired Evidence: Second Cousins Benefit From 20/20 Hindsight, 
49 ARK. L. REV. 211, 223-44 (1996). For an example of the courts’ treating an employer’s proffered 
explanation as a pretext under the NLRA, see Great Lakes, 967 F.2d at 628-29. For an example of 
pretext in the Title VII context, see St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508-09 (1993). 
 53. For a discussion of the difficulty in meeting the burden of proof to establish that an employer 
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this difficulty, the Board first used the “in part” test: if the reason for the 
employer’s discharge was based “in part” on the employee’s organizing 
activity, the employer had an impermissible motive and thus had 
committed an unfair labor practice.54 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,55 
however, discredited the test, and ultimately the Supreme Court abrogated 
the standard.56  
B. The Motivating Factor, or Wright Line, Test 
Following the Supreme Court’s disapproval of the “in part” test for 
determining a discriminatory discharge, the Board adopted the “motivating 
factor” test, known as the Wright Line57 test. Under Wright Line, the 
Board’s General Counsel bears the initial burden to show that: (1) the 
employer had an impermissible motive of antiunion animus58 and (2) the 
employer engaged in an activity covered by the NLRA,59 such as 
discharging an employee for his union affiliation.60 Once the General 
Counsel makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the employer to show 
that even absent the employee’s affiliation, he would have been 
had committed an unfair labor practice, see Joan E. Baker, NLRA Section 8(a)(3) and the Search for a 
National Labor Policy, 7 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 71, 98-102 (1989). 
 54. Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp. Ass’n, 224 N.L.R.B. 574 (1976), enforcement denied, 574 
F.2d 891 (6th Cir. 1978). In Youngstown, the Board had to assess whether the employer engaged in an 
unfair labor practice when it claimed it discharged an employee for dereliction of duty, while the 
employee and union argued that the employee was discharged for distributing union literature. 224 
N.L.R.B. at 574. In light of the in-part test, the Board concluded that despite productivity problems, 
the employee was in part discharged for union participation, and the employer had thus committed an 
unfair labor practice. Id. at 575.  
 55. Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp. Ass’n, 574 F.2d 891, 891 (6th Cir. 1978). In a terse opinion, 
the court found that there was insufficient evidence for the Board to find an unfair labor practice. Id.  
 56. See Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). The Court 
observed that the in-part test would incorrectly allow for an employee who would have been 
discharged for a permissible purpose to be reinstated merely because an impermissible purpose existed 
as well. Id. at 285-86.  
 57. The name originates from the case that announced the rule: Wright Line, A Div. of Wright 
Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980). 
 58. Id. at 1089. See also NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983) (indicating actual 
intent or motive by the employer, in other words, “antiunion animus” must be shown); Am. Ship Bldg. 
Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311 (1965) (stating that “a finding of violation . . . will normally turn on 
the employer’s motivation”).  
 59. 221 N.L.R.B. at 1089. One commentator notes that “[v]irtually any action an employer may 
take that adversely affects employees who are engaged in organization or other union-related activities 
will satisfy the ‘discrimination’ element.” See Baker, supra note 53, at 96.  
 60. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1090. In Wright Line, the employee was discharged for 
encouraging coworkers to join a union. Id. The employer showed antiunion animus through its agent’s 
comments to employees concerning the employer’s stability should the work force unionize and his 
reference to a union official’s murder indictment. Id.  
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discharged.61 The Supreme Court subsequently approved of this 
formulation,62 and the test continues to be used in discharge cases and has 
been adopted for use in hiring situations, as well. 
C. The Problem of Applying the Prima Facie Test to Discrimination in 
Hiring Situations 
Proving discrimination in hiring poses difficulties that establishing 
discrimination in discharge does not. For example, if Beth, a nonunion 
employee of Dan’s Widget Company, meets with her local union about 
organizing her work group, and Dan discharges her soon after discovering 
the meetings, the General Counsel thereby has the facts he needs to make 
his prima facie case on Beth’s behalf.63 First, Beth is an ascertainable 
individual who suffered a “covered action,” i.e., she was discharged.64 
Second, as an employee, Beth knows her coworkers and can find out from 
them if Dan has taken any action or made any statements regarding her 
organizing activities.65 Employer statements are a primary method used to 
show antiunion animus.66 Further, if Beth had developed a satisfactory 
work record prior to discharge, Dan’s burden of showing a permissible 
motive becomes more difficult.67  
In a hiring situation, however, the facts are not as clear or ascertainable 
as they are in the discharge context. If Beth (the organizer) applies for a 
job at Dan’s Widget Company and is not hired, it could be because the 
employer decided not to hire at all, which means a “covered action” never 
took place.68 Additionally, the employer may have already decided to hire 
 61. Id. at 1089. 
 62. NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983). 
 63. See supra note 30 and accompanying text concerning the General Counsel’s role in gathering 
evidence. 
 64. This addresses the second element of the Wright Line test. See supra note 60 and 
accompanying text. 
 65. This addresses the first required element of the Wright Line test. See supra note 58 and 
accompanying text.  
 66. See, e.g., Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. NLRB, 967 F.2d 624, 626 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 
(concluding antiunion animus was shown where personnel manager for employer told company 
directors to hire nonunion employees and that union officers were “troublemakers”). 
 67. This addresses the employer’s burden when it shifts from the General Counsel for the Board, 
who has established elements one and two of the Wright Line test, to the employer, who must then 
show that “the same action would have taken place even in the absence of the protected conduct.” 
Wright Line, 251 NLRB at 1089. 
 68. See NLRB v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 161 F.3d 953, 967 (6th Cir. 1998) (“If an employer has no 
job openings, and a union activist nonetheless submits a job application, as a matter of law the 
[discrimination] element of the statutory violation cannot be established.”). 
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someone with better qualifications.69 Further, if Beth does not know 
anything about the organization or its current employees, she cannot easily 
get evidence from other employees or insiders as to the employer’s 
motivation by making statements or taking actions regarding Beth’s status 
as an organizer.70 Thus, proving discrimination in hiring poses more 
evidentiary difficulty. 
As a result of this difficulty, the Board’s application of the two-part test 
in refusal-to-hire cases has been inconsistently upheld by courts of 
appeals.71 Until it formally adopted a new test in 2000,72 the Board held 
that an employer who had both antiunion animus and had hired some 
applicant into some open position rather than a salt had discriminated in 
hiring.73 The Board did not inquire about the relationship between the 
number of positions available at the time of the alleged proscribed conduct 
and the number of job applications made by salts. Also, the Board failed to 
compare the qualifications of the persons who ultimately filled the 
positions with the qualifications of the salts who did not.74  
Because courts of appeals did not unanimously agree with the Board’s 
two-part test,75 the Board made the test for discrimination more specific to 
 69. See id. at 967. The court stated that if union activists are not qualified for a job, the statutory 
violation cannot be established because the employer “had no positions for which they could have 
been considered.” Id. 
 70. See sources cited supra note 58 for an explanation that antiunion animus must be shown in 
order to make out a prima facie case. 
 71. For a comparison of the inconsistent applications of the two-part test by courts of appeals, 
see the discussion of Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. NLRB, 967 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Ultrasystems 
W. Constructors, Inc. v. NLRB, 18 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1994); NLRB v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 161 F.3d 953 
(6th Cir. 1998); Starcon, Inc. v. NLRB, 176 F.3d 948 (7th Cir. 1999); infra Part IV of this Note. 
 72. See FES, supra note 19. 
 73. See, e.g., Shawnee Ind., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 1451, 1452-53 (1963), stating:  
Under the Act an Employer must consider a request for employment in a lawful, 
nondiscriminatory manner, and the question whether an application has been given such 
consideration does not depend on the availability of a job at the time an application for 
employment is made. Consequently, the Act is violated when an employer fails to consider an 
application for employment for reasons proscribed by the Act, and the question of job availability 
is relevant only with respect to the employer’s backpay obligation. 
See also Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 298 N.L.R.B. 615 (1990) (finding that antiunion animus was so 
overwhelming that the animus and general hiring activity of employer was sufficient to make prima 
facie case).  
 74. See Fluor Daniel, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 498 (1993) (holding that when employer was hiring in 
various classifications, fifty-four salts applied for jobs in several classifications and were not hired, 
which showed antiunion animus, thus employer committed unfair labor practice against fifty-three 
applicants).  
 75. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 161 F.3d at 967 (rejecting the Board’s argument that 
“it should be able to establish a prima facie case . . . simply by proving the existence of anti-union 
animus and by showing that there were some job vacancies applied for by some voluntary union 
organizers”); Starcon, Inc. v. NLRB, 176 F.3d 948, 951 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding order to award 
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job openings and applicants in FES (A Division of Thermo Power and 
Plumbers and Pipefitters Local 520 of the United Association).76 The 
Board’s test under FES states that discrimination occurs if: (1) the 
employer was hiring, or had concrete plans to hire, at the time of the 
alleged unlawful conduct; (2) the applicants had experience or training 
relevant to the announced or generally known requirements of the 
positions for hire, or in the alternative, that the employer has not adhered 
uniformly to such requirements, or that the requirements were themselves 
pretextual or were applied as a pretext for discrimination; and (3) 
antiunion animus contributed to the decision not to hire the applicants.77 
The Board’s test therefore maintains the original two-pronged inquiry into 
protected activity (i.e., hiring or discharge combined with antiunion 
animus), but makes the test more concrete by requiring the Board’s 
General Counsel to match at least one specific applicant to a specific job 
opening.78 
In determining what the most appropriate test for discrimination in 
hiring should be, and whether the approach taken by the Board is sound, it 
is useful to examine another federal statutory scheme. Because Title VII79 
is the most closely related federal statute to the NLRA in addressing the 
issue of discrimination with regard to hiring, comparing the purposes and 
applications of both statutes can lend insight into the appropriate test for 
discrimination in hiring.  
III. HOW DOES TITLE VII DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING COMPARE  
TO THE NLRA? 
Comparing the NLRA to Title VII demonstrates why the Title VII test 
to establish a prima facie case could also be applied under the NLRA. As 
an initial matter, Congress passed the NLRA and Title VII to protect the 
employment to more applicants than there were job openings “overbroad”). 
 76. FES, supra note 19. 
 77. Id. at 12. 
 78. The Board adopted its test after requesting that the parties in FES address the discrimination 
in hire issue with respect to the courts of appeals opinions in Ultrasystems, Fluor Daniel, and Starcon, 
discussed in Part IV of this Note. The Board stated that it agreed with the Starcon holding. FES, 331 
N.L.R.B. at 14. This portion of the opinion, specific to the making of a prima facie case, is consistent 
with the holding in Ultrasystems. See infra Part IV.D (discussing Starcon) and Part IV.B (discussing 
Ultrasystems). The Board also asked the parties to brief the issue of establishing a case of 
discriminatory refusal to consider applicants for employment. See 331 N.L.R.B. at 9. For a discussion 
of the refusal to consider issue, see Ultrasystems, 18 F.3d at 255; Fluor Daniel, 161 F.3d at 967; and 
Starcon, 176 F.3d at 950. The refusal to consider issue is beyond the scope of this Note.  
 79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2000). 
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rights of employees in the work place.80 Further, the NLRA—the older of 
the two statutes—seems to have influenced the application of Title VII.81  
Additionally, the Title VII test used to determine whether a prima facie 
case for discrimination in hiring exists appears facially similar to the 
NLRA test.82 The burden-shifting approach adopted in both the NLRA and 
Title VII contexts is closely related to the formulation of the prima facie 
case and is similarly applied in both schemes.83 Under both the NLRA and 
 80. Compare unfair labor practices of an employer under the NLRA: “It shall be an unfair labor 
practice for an employer . . . by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term 
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization,” 29 
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), with prohibited employer conduct under Title VII: “It shall be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). 
 81. The NLRA was originally codified in 1932 as the Norris-Laguardia Act, Ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 
(1932); amended by the 1935 Wagner Act (officially named the National Labor Relations Act), ch. 
372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), and the Landrum-
Griffin Act of 1959, Pub.L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959). The final Act has been in force in major 
part since 1988, subsequent to minor amendments after the 1959 Act was implemented. 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 151-69 (2000). Title VII was passed under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The most noted application 
of the NLRA in the Title VII context is in the remedial phase of litigation. See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont 
de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 849 (2001) (indicating that back pay remedy in § 706(g) of Title VII 
was modeled after language in NLRA). 
 82. Compare the test for the prima facie case under the NLRA as most recently articulated in 
FES: (1) the respondent (employer) was hiring, or had concrete plans to hire, at the time of the alleged 
unlawful conduct; (2) the applicants had experience or training relevant to the announced or generally 
or generally known requirements of the positions for hire, or in the alternative, the employer had not 
adhered uniformly to such requirements, or that the requirements were themselves pretextual or were 
applied as a pretext for discrimination; and (3) antiunion animus contributed to the decision not to hire 
the applicants, FES, 331 N.L.R.B. at 12, with the Title VII test for discrimination in a pretext situation: 
(1) that [the employee] belongs to [a protected group]; (2) that he applied and was qualified for a 
job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that, despite his qualifications, he was 
rejected; and (4) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to 
seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications.  
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); and the test under Title VII for 
discrimination in a “mixed-motive” situation: the plaintiff in a Title VII case must “show[] that [the 
protected characteristic] played a motivating part in an employment decision,” Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244 (1989).  
 83. Under the NLRA in FES, once the General Counsel for the Board has made a prima facie 
case, the burden shifts to the employer to show that it would not have hired the applicant even in the 
absence of his union activity or affiliation. FES, 331 N.L.R.B. at 12. Under the McDonnell Douglas 
pretext scenario as expanded by St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, once the plaintiff has made out his 
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to show that there was a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for its failure to hire the plaintiff. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 
502, 506-07 (1993). If the employer meets its burden, the plaintiff must then overcome the defendant’s 
evidence, either by showing pretext or by using the lack of credibility of the employer coupled with 
the strength of the employee’s prima facie case. Id. at 506-08. In the Title VII “mixed-motive” 
scenario, once the plaintiff has made the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to show 
that it would have made the same decision even if it had not allowed the protected characteristic to 
play a role. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45.  
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Title VII, burden shifting has been the best way for courts to deal with the 
fact that cases involving discrimination in hiring are often based on 
circumstantial evidence.84  
The major similarity, however, that makes the test used under Title VII 
applicable in the NLRA context is the fact that the motive requirement of 
the prima facie case under either scheme can be met by inference alone. 
Allowing the use of inference is based largely on the difficulties in 
determining motive.85  
There are also differences between the two statutes. Originally, one of 
the key purposes of the NLRA was to maintain workplace peace.86 Both 
employers and employees had legitimate business interests87 that, because 
of self-interest, occasionally came into conflict. The NLRA also addresses 
 84. In the NLRA context, see Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1083 (supporting the burden-shifting 
paradigm by stating: “[I]n modern day labor relations, an employer will rarely, if ever, baldly assert 
that it has disciplined an employee because it detests unions. . .”); in the Title VII context, see Tristin 
K. Green, Making Sense of the McDonnell Douglas Framework: Circumstantial Evidence and Proof 
of Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 87 CAL. L. REV. 983, 983 (1999) (arguing that for Title VII to 
“retain its force,” circumstantial evidence must be used “[b]ecause discrimination today is rarely 
overt”).  
 85. Under the NLRA, the Supreme Court recognized that animus can be shown by inference with 
its 1954 decision in Radio Officers Union of Commercial Telegraphers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 
44-45 (1954) (stating that “[t]his recognition that specific proof of intent is unnecessary where 
employer conduct inherently encourages or discourages union membership is but an application of the 
common-law rule that a man is held to intend the foreseeable consequences of his conduct”) (citations 
omitted). For a modern application of the use of inference in making a prima facie case under the 
NLRA, see FiveCAP, Inc. v. NLRB, 294 F.3d 768, 777-78 (6th Cir. 2002) (describing the ways 
animus can be shown entirely circumstantially, such as “the company’s expressed hostility towards 
unionization combined with knowledge of the employees’ union activities; inconsistencies between the 
proffered reason for discharge and other actions of the employer; disparate treatment of certain 
employees compared to other employees with similar work records or offenses; a company’s deviation 
from past practices in implementing the discharge; and proximity in time between the employees’ 
union activities and their discharge”). In the Title VII context, the analysis is the same. See Texas 
Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (“The burden of establishing a prima 
facie case [under the McDonnell Douglas framework] is not onerous. The plaintiff must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that she applied for an available position for which she was qualified, 
but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to the inference of unlawful discrimination.”). 
One commentator suggests that a “nominal intent” requirement exists for Title VII cases, by which no 
discriminatory intent is required for there to be a violation of Title VII. See Deborah L. Brake, School 
Liability for Peer Sexual Harassment After Davis: Shifting from Intent to Causation in Discrimination 
Law, 12 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 5, 32 (2001). The author compares Title VII to Title IX in her 
discussion of Title IX’s lack of an intent requirement. Id. at 30-33. For an argument that motive is not 
the proper inquiry in a discrimination context, see Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our 
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995).  
 86. See Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781, 785 (1996). 
 87. For a discussion of the assumptions of employer interests with respect to the NLRA versus 
Title VII in the mitigation context, see Howard C. Eglit, Damages Mitigation Doctrine in the Statutory 
Anti-Discrimination Context: Mitigating its Negative Impact, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 57-58 (2000).  
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the basic bargaining inequalities between workers and employers.88 Title 
VII, in contrast, addresses wholly illegitimate employer considerations, 
directed at an individual, that have no socially or economically redeeming 
value.89 Additionally, the NLRA addresses employment discrimination in 
cases where the individual is not a target because of any personal 
characteristics, but because of his affiliation to a union.90 By contrast, Title 
VII addresses discrimination on the basis of characteristics that are 
inherent to individual persons.91  
Additionally, litigation arising out of discrimination in the NLRA 
context is usually intended to benefit the bargaining unit or group of 
employees as a whole. Therefore, the Board is the plaintiff, rather than an 
individual.92 In Title VII cases, however, the trend in litigation has been 
 88. In its findings, Congress indicated that  
[t]he inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of 
association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other 
forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce . . . and 
prevent[s] the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between 
industries.  
29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).  
 89. While a nonunion employer can argue that it is economically infeasible to operate as a union 
business, an employer has no legitimate argument for refusing to hire a female or minority applicant 
solely based on their status as a female or minority. For support of an employer’s position with regard 
to the economic difficulties in operating a nonunion business, see BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, TABLE 4: MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF FULL-TIME WAGE AND SALARY 
WORKERS BY UNION AFFILIATION, OCCUPATION, AND INDUSTRY, 2001, available at http://www.bls. 
gov/news.release/union2.t04.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2003). In the transportation sector, for example, 
the average union worker earns $781 per week, while his nonunion counterpart earns $609. Id. In 
contrast, an employer cannot make an argument that race or sex discrimination has some validity, 
particularly as seen in light of the congressional findings the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted. S. 
REP. 88-872 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. No. 2355, 2362. Congress emphasized that the 
legislation is based on an overall desire to provide equal opportunity and eliminate discrimination. Id. 
Congress echoed these aspirations when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, stating that “America 
is a better country because we as a people have moved forward toward the goal of eradicating 
discrimination.” H.R. REP. 102-40(I) at 15 (1991) reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 553. 
 90. The only inquiry under the NLRA involves whether an employer attempted to “interfere 
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of . . . the right to self-organization, to form, join, or 
assist labor organizations . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 157 & 158(a)(1) (2000). 
 91. Title VII clearly addresses individual issues of discrimination: “It shall be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer to . . . discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added). 
Additionally, the Supreme Court indicated that the purpose of Title VII was to “strike at the entire 
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment.” Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 
477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). 
 92. In fact, an aggrieved party cannot take action against an employer unless the General Counsel 
files a complaint on his behalf. See NLRB v. United Food & Comm. Wkrs. Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 
112, 133 (1987) (holding that under 29 U.S.C. § 160(f), the decision of General Counsel not to file a 
complaint was not subject to a court’s review). 
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away from disparate—impact cases where an entire class has been the 
victim of discrimination, and toward individual cases of disparate 
treatment, where one aggrieved individual has initiated a suit against the 
employer.93 The result is that the plaintiff in an NLRA case has more equal 
bargaining power with the employer than an individual Title VII plaintiff 
because of the increased leverage that the NLRB provides.94 A Title VII 
plaintiff usually has to find his own attorney and stand up to the employer 
on his own.95 These differences highlight the fact that the similarities 
between these statutes far outweigh the differences, particularly in the 
making of a prima facie case for discrimination in hiring.  
The similarities between Title VII and the NLRA in the making of the 
prima facie case under either regime make the application of the 
McDonnell Douglas test under Title VII applicable to an unfair labor 
practice under the NLRA.96 The discrimination-in-hiring issue under the 
NLRA has not been addressed by several courts of appeals or the Supreme 
Court to date, and the courts of appeals that have addressed it do not 
agree.97 An examination of the four courts of appeals’ decisions addressing 
the issue highlights the evidentiary problem in refusal-to-hire cases and 
 93. For a statistical breakdown of lawsuits brought by the EEOC and the private bar, see Michael 
Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency’s Role in Employment Discrimination Law, 
57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1996).  
 94. The statistical data in supra note 32 shows the extremely high settlement rate of charges 
brought before the Board. The comparison is similar to the settlement rate for the charges litigated by 
the EEOC. The EEOC has an 83% settlement rate, where the private bar has a 60% to 65% settlement 
rate. See Selmi, supra note 93, at 14, 22.  
 95. Together, the EEOC and the Justice Department litigate approximately 5% of the cases 
brought under Title VII each year. See Selmi, supra note 93, at 21 n.82. For a discussion of the 
plaintiff’s difficulty in obtaining evidence in a disparate treatment discrimination case, see Ronald 
Turner, 30 Years of Title VII’s Regulatory Regime: Rights, Theories, and Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 
375, 432-35 (1995).  
 96. The similarities primarily address the purposes of the statutes and the making of the prima 
facie case under the two regimes. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text. The differences, 
however, primarily relate to the nature of the specific plaintiff in each case. See supra notes 90-95 and 
accompanying text. The court’s discussion in Fluor Daniel appears to be the only time that the 
applicability of Title VII to the NLRA refusal-to-hire issue was raised. In briefs before the Sixth 
Circuit, Fluor Daniel argued that the McDonnell Douglas test should be applied to NLRA cases. See 
Brief of Fluor Daniel, Inc. at 32, NLRB v. Fluor Daniel, Inc. 161 F.3d 953 (6th Cir. 1998) (No. 94-
6108) (“[T]he principles of proof the Supreme Court announced in McDonnell Douglas . . . can and 
should be used as a guide to defining the General Counsel’s minimum burden in this case.”). In its 
original opinion, the Sixth Circuit panel agreed with Fluor Daniel and used the McDonnell Douglas 
framework in its analysis of the refusal-to-hire issue. Fluor Daniel, 102 F.3d 818, 832 (6th Cir. 1996). 
The Sixth Circuit, in its amended opinion, the Sixth Circuit changed course and “happily” refused to 
address the McDonnell Douglas test. Fluor Daniel, 161 F.3d at 966.  
 97. The D.C. Circuit addressed the issue in Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. NLRB, 967 F.2d 624 
(D.C. Cir. 1992); the Fourth Circuit in Ultrasystems W. Constructors, Inc. v. NLRB, 18 F.3d 251 (4th 
Cir. 1994); the Sixth Circuit in NLRB v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 161 F.3d 953 (6th Cir. 1998); and the 
Seventh Circuit in Starcon, Inc. v. NLRB, 176 F.3d 948 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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evidences that a more concrete test—even more concrete than the test 
offered by the Board in FES—must be adopted.  
IV. FOUR NLRA CASES WITH FOUR DIFFERENT RESULTS 
A. Great Lakes: If You Were Hiring and You Didn’t Like the Union, and 
As a Result You Failed to Hire Union Adherents into Your Workforce, 
You Did a Bad Thing and Your Penalty Is to Hire Every Adherent Who 
Wanted to Work for You 
In Great Lakes Chemical Corp. v. NLRB,98 the D.C. Circuit faced a 
refusal-to-hire case in which a company purchased an existing company 
and did not hire the former employees who were union members when it 
hired new employees.99 The court analyzed the union’s allegation of 
discrimination in hiring by applying the Wright Line model as its test for 
determining whether an employer has committed an unfair labor 
practice.100 First, the court found that the employer was hiring because it 
had to replace the workers who had been laid off by the prior company.101 
Further, the court found there was evidence of antiunion animus in that the 
personnel manager of the employer actively sought to hire new employees 
not affiliated with the union.102 Specifically, the personnel manager 
recommended to the company that, with respect to newly hired employees, 
“it be clearly understood . . . that ‘[the company] wish[es] to operate on a 
non-union basis,’” and also commented that several union officers were 
“troublemakers.”103  
Once the court determined that the General Counsel had met his burden 
by showing both a general failure to hire and antiunion animus, the court 
used the Wright Line burden-shifting analysis to examine the reasons 
asserted by the employer for its failure to hire the former employees.104 
The employer stated it had a legitimate business reason for its actions 
because it had fluctuating business demands that precluded the hiring of 
all former employees.105 The court rejected the reason as a pretext,106 
 98. 967 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 99. Id. at 625. Although the case is not specifically a salting case, it highlights the issues of the 
making of a prima facie case regarding the refusal-to-hire issue and has been used in at least one 
court’s salting analysis. See Starcon, 176 F.3d at 950.  
 100. 967 F.2d at 627. 
 101. Id. at 626. 
 102. Id. at 628. The employer “blacklisted” former union officers and rehired the minimum 
possible former union member employees. Id. 
 103. Id. at 626. 
 104. See supra note 67. 
 
 105. 967 F.2d at 628. In addition to refusing to hire former union employees, the employer used 
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finding that the employer had committed an unfair labor practice.107  
The court did not inquire into what jobs were available at the time of 
the alleged discrimination. The fact that the former employees were not 
hired, coupled with the finding of antiunion animus, was sufficient to 
show that an unfair labor practice had been committed.108 
As a result of these findings, the court upheld the Board’s order that all 
former employees be offered employment by the employer.109 The court 
indicated that the “broadly damning character of the evidence”110 against 
the employer suggested that every former employee had been “turned 
away because of his union adherence.”111 The court rejected the 
employer’s argument that the order was overbroad and punitive in 
nature.112 The court conceded that the employer would have an 
opportunity, at the compliance stage of the proceedings, to show that 
certain employees were not suitable for rehire.113  
B. Ultrasystems: If You Were Hiring and You Didn’t Like the Union, and 
as a Result You Failed to Hire Any Salts, You Did a Bad Thing, but 
You Only Have to Hire as Many Salts as You Would Have Hired if You 
Had Been Good 
In Ultrasystems Western Constructors, Inc. v. NLRB,114 the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals faced a construction company’s refusal to hire 
sixty-six applicants who were known union organizers.115 The court, like 
the Great Lakes court, initially followed the Wright Line test.116 It found, 
an employment service that required each prospective employee to sign a waiver agreeing not to file 
suit against the employment agency if he were later laid off or fired. Id. at 626-27.  
 106. Id. at 628-29. The Board has defined pretext as the situation in which the employer’s true 
motive for taking an adverse action against an employee was antiunion animus, but it asserts a 
legitimate business reason for its action that is actually a “sham.” See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 
1083-84.  
 107. 967 F.2d at 629. 
 108. Id. at 628. The court stated that the employer’s “wholesale rejection” of former employees 
shows a broad pattern that “necessarily entailed refusing to hire individual employees.” Id.  
 109. Id. at 629-30. 
 110. Id. at 628. 
 111. Id.  
 112. Id. at 629-30. 
 113. Id. The court stated that “any recognized defense to the order’s implementation can be raised 
by a petition to review the compliance order.” Id. at 630 (citing Local 512, Warehouse & Office 
Worker’s Union v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 705, 715 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
 114. 18 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1994).  
 115. Id. at 252.  
 116. Id. at 257. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text. 
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agreeing with the Board, that the employer was hiring,117 and that the 
reason none of the sixty-six applicants were hired was because the 
employer was aware that they were members of a union organizing 
drive.118 The court also found that, the employer showed antiunion 
animus.119 
Because the General Counsel had made a prima facie case, the burden 
shifted to the employer, who offered evidence that it did not hire any of 
the applicants because their applications were either stale, or because the 
applicants were not qualified or not interested.120 Nonetheless, the court 
found that the General Counsel had established enough contrary evidence 
to determine that discrimination did take place.121  
In this determination, neither the Board nor the court compared the jobs 
open at the time of the discrimination or the qualifications that the 
openings required to the pool of available applicants.122 The Ultrasystems 
court therefore followed the same reasoning as the court in Great Lakes in 
determining if discrimination had occurred. At the remedy stage, however, 
the court refused to enforce the Board’s order that the employer hire all 
sixty-six applicants who had not been hired when they had applied for 
jobs.123 The court stated that the proposed remedy had to “be tailored to 
the unfair labor practice it is intended to redress.”124 The court remanded 
the case to the Board to fashion a proper remedy of its choosing so long as 
the remedy fit the actual discrimination.125 Thus, the court’s remedy 
departed from the remedy ordered in Great Lakes, where the D.C. Circuit 
 117. Id. at 256. 
 118. Id. at 253. 
 119. Id. at 257. The employer made “direct statements of antiunion motive with respect to the[] 
applications.” Id. 
 120. Id. at 257. 
 121. Id. The court indicated that the employer had an opportunity to show that absent the 
impermissible motive, it would still have not hired any of the applicants, and it failed to meet the 
burden in light of the evidence. See id. 
 122. Id. at 257-58. The court acknowledged that there was controversy over the appropriate time 
for the employer to show that specific applicants were not qualified for specific openings, and further 
acknowledged that there was a “limit” to how much could be deferred to a later compliance 
proceeding. Id. at 257. Nonetheless, it concluded that the evidence showed a violation, and upheld the 
Board’s finding on that issue. Id. at 257-58. 
 123. Id. at 258. The court commented, “the Board went beyond the scope permitted by § 10(c) of 
the Act.” Id. 
 124. Id. at 258 (quoting Sure-Tan Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 900 (1984)). The Sure-Tan court 
stated: “[I]t remains a cardinal, albeit frequently unarticulated assumption, that a backpay remedy must 
be sufficiently tailored to expunge only the actual, and not merely speculative, consequences of the 
unfair labor practice.” Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 900. The Ultrasystems court found additional support for 
this proposition in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 198 (1941), which stated “only actual 
losses should be made good.” 18 F.3d at 258.  
 125. Id. at 259. 
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agreed with the Board that the proper remedy would be for the employer 
to offer employment to all applicants who had not been offered 
employment by the employer.126 
C. Fluor Daniel: If You Were Hiring for Certain Jobs and You Denied 
Qualified Salts Because You Didn’t Like the Union, Your Penalty Is to 
Hire the Qualified Salts 
In NLRB v. Fluor Daniel, Inc.,127 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
faced an employer who was charged with an unfair labor practice for 
refusing to hire forty-two applicants who had written “voluntary union 
organizer” on their applications.128 The Sixth Circuit, like the Fourth and 
D.C. Circuits, used the Wright Line test and described how the burdens 
were assessed against each party.129 In interpreting the test, the Sixth 
Circuit, unlike the Fourth and D.C. Circuits, emphasized that the General 
Counsel must show that an actual failure to hire a qualified person must 
occur for there to be a violation.130 
The court first ascertained that the employer was hiring at the time the 
alleged discrimination took place.131 The court then examined the Board’s 
finding that a failure to hire protected employees had taken place.132 The 
employer claimed that at the time the alleged discrimination took place it 
only needed to fill positions for six carpenters, two pipe welders, and eight 
boilermakers.133 The Board found that a group of union organizers applied 
for jobs with the employer, the employer was hiring, and none of the 
organizers were hired.134 The Board also found evidence sufficient to 
constitute antiunion animus.135 Based on the employer’s refusal to hire the 
applicants and the evidence of antiunion animus, the Board determined 
 126. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text. 
 127. 161 F.3d 953 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 128. Id. at 956. 
 129. Id. at 965. 
 130. Id. at 967. The court emphatically stated: “We therefore reject the NLRB’s argument that it 
should be able to establish a prima facie case of an unfair labor practice in a refusal-to-hire case simply 
by proving the existence of anti-union animus and by showing there were some job vacancies applied 
for by some voluntary union organizers . . . .” Id. 
 131. Id. at 956. 
 132. Id. at 964-71. 
 133. Id. at 956. 
 134. Id. at 956-57. The Board also found, however, that the employer did hire a significant 
number of employees for other positions that were connected to organized labor. Id. at 957. 
 135. The Board found that the employer gave some applicants easier welding tests than others, 
and that when one newly hired employee asked what would happen if he refused to cross a picket line, 
the employer replied that after two warnings he would be fired. Id. at 957-58. 
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that the employer had committed an unfair labor practice.136 As a remedy, 
the Board ordered that all the applicants who were not hired be offered the 
positions they applied for or similarly equivalent positions.137  
The Sixth Circuit disagreed with the Board with respect to the elements 
of the prima facie case, as well as with respect to the remedy.138 The court 
held that the General Counsel must, in addition to showing antiunion 
animus, match job openings at the time of the alleged discrimination to the 
actual applicants to determine if there was discrimination.139 To illustrate, 
if twelve welders applied for jobs and the employer had two openings, but 
the openings were for plumbers, there would be no violation, even if the 
employer posted signs that said, “We hate unions.” Because the General 
Counsel failed to match job openings to those applicants who were not 
hired, the court refused to uphold the Board’s order and remanded that 
issue to the Board to determine if some nexus existed between antiunion 
animus and an actual hiring decision.140 
With its holding, the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the Fourth Circuit’s 
Ultrasystems decision.141 The Ultrasystems court held that if job openings 
existed at the time the union organizers applied, that finding, in 
conjunction with a showing of antiunion animus, would be sufficient to 
make a prima facie case.142 The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that 
“Ultrasystems stopped short of our holding today”143 by failing to require 
job matching in making out a prima facie case.144 
 136. Id. at 960. 
 137. Id. In fact, the Board explicitly disagreed with the Ultrasystems court by denying the 
employer’s motion to review the remedy of offering positions to all applicants based on the holding in 
the Ultrasystems decision. Id.  
 138. Id. at 966. The court stated,  
[i]t cannot be an unfair labor practice merely for an employer to harbor animus against union 
members applying for jobs that do not exist or have already been filled, or for which they are not 
qualified. If such conduct were an unfair labor practice, then the mere entertainment and 
expression of anti-union animus would constitute an unfair labor practice. 
Id. 
 139. Id. at 967. To illustrate, the court explained that, with regard to qualifications, “[t]here is no 
interference with, restraint, or coercion of applicants in the exercise of their protected rights when an 
employer, even with anti-union animus, rejects applicants who are in fact unqualified . . . .” Id. Also, 
with respect to job openings, it stated, “[i]f an employer has no job openings, and a union activist 
nonetheless submits a job application, as a matter of law the [occurrence of the covered action of 
hiring] element of the statutory violation cannot be established.” Id.  
 140. Id. at 975. 
 141. Id. at 969-70. 
 142. Ultrasystems, 18 F.3d at 256. 
 143. Fluor Daniel, 161 F.3d at 969. 
 144. Id. The Fluor Daniel court did not agree with the Fourth Circuit’s proposition that job 
matching could be deferred to the compliance stage of Board proceedings. Id. at 970. It explained that 
deferring the determination of employer liability in terms of the actual applicants that were not hired is 
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The Sixth Circuit did agree with the Fourth Circuit, however, in 
holding that the remedy for an employer’s unfair labor practice in hiring 
must fit the unfair labor practice committed.145 The court ultimately 
remanded the case to the Board for a determination of whether jobs 
matched the applicants at the time of the alleged discrimination.146 
D. Starcon: If You Were Hiring and Didn’t Like the Union, and as a 
Result Refused to Hire at Least One Qualified Salt, You Did a Bad 
Thing and Your Penalty Will Be to Hire Some Qualified Salts After the 
Board Looks into Just How Bad You Were 
In Starcon, Inc. v. NLRB,147 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals faced 
a nonunion employer who received applications from eighty union 
organizers.148 The employer rejected seventy-eight of the eighty union-
affiliated applicants even though it required an influx of manpower.149 The 
court found antiunion animus based on Starcon’s actions in treating the 
applicants poorly, treating those union organizers it did hire poorly, and 
trying to avoid hiring organizers by subcontracting the hiring to an 
agency.150 
The Starcon court, benefitting from the discussions in prior decisions 
“counterintuitive, even backwards,” and may violate due process. Id. The court indicated that Fluor 
Daniel had raised a “sound objection[]” on the due process issue before the court. Id. In its brief, Flour 
Daniel argued that “in order to prove discrimination with regard to hiring, the evidence must show . . . 
that jobs were available for the applicants when they applied . . . .” Fluor Daniel’s Brief of Application 
for Enforcement of an Order of the National Labor Relations Board at 34, NLRB v. Fluor Daniel, Inc. 
161 F.3d 953 (6th Cir. 1998) (No. 94-6108) Fluor Daniel went on to argue that: 
A party is entitled, of course, to know the issues on which the decision will turn and to be apprised 
of the factual material on which the agency relies for its decision so that he may rebut it. Indeed, 
the Due Process Clause forbids an agency to use evidence in a way that forecloses an opportunity 
to offer a contrary presentation.  
Id. (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight, 419 U.S. 281, 288 n.4 (1974)).  
 145. The Fluor Daniel court indicated that if the job matching is done at the time the prima facie 
case is made, the Board would have a “broad panoply of remedies” at its disposal, which will lessen 
the probability that its order will be struck down by a court of appeals for being overly broad. Id. at 
969-70.  
 146. Id. at 975. 
 147. 176 F.3d 948 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 148. Id. at 949. The court stated that the union likely knew it had no chance of organizing the 
workforce, and that applicants identified themselves as union organizers on their employment 
applications to precipitate unfair labor practice charges against the employer. Id. See also Northrup, 
supra notes 14 and 43. 
 149. Id.  
 150. Id. at 949-50. The court did not indicate, however, that it was using the Wright Line test in its 
determination that an unfair labor practice had been committed. It instead focused its opinion on the 
issue of whether the Board “was required to ‘match’ the organizer applicants to the job openings . . .” 
Id. at 950. 
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in the D.C., Fourth, and Sixth Circuits in Great Lakes,151 Ultrasystems,152 
and Fluor Daniel,153 respectively, examined the salting situation from the 
three circuits’ perspectives.154 The Starcon court refused to adopt the view 
held by the Sixth Circuit that the burden must be on the Board to match 
applicants to jobs, and instead held that it is not necessary for the General 
Counsel to match applicants to job openings in making his case.155 The 
court did agree with the Sixth Circuit, however, that there must be a 
showing in the making of the prima facie case that at least one applicant 
was discriminated against in hiring, although the General Counsel need 
not show which one.156 
The Seventh Circuit, after determining the requirement for the making 
of a prima facie case, refused enforcement of the Board’s order to offer 
employment to all eighty applicants.157 Because the employer hired far 
fewer than eighty employees during the period of discrimination, the court 
reasoned that the Board’s order was overbroad.158 Thus, the holding with 
respect to the remedy for the unfair labor practice is consistent with the 
Fourth Circuit’s holding in Ultrasystems,159 as well as the Sixth Circuit’s 
holding in Fluor Daniel.160  
In summary, the four circuits have applied the Wright Line test in 
different ways and as a result have reached different conclusions. The D.C. 
Circuit,161 at one end of the spectrum, is the most deferential toward the 
Board’s General Counsel in the establishment of a prima facie case.162 The 
 151. See supra Part IV.A.  
 152. See supra Part IV.B. 
 153. See supra Part IV.C. 
 154. Starcon, 176 F.3d at 950. The court acknowledged that the D.C. and Sixth Circuits are in 
conflict, with the D.C. Circuit agreeing with the Board. Id.  
 155. Id. at 951. The court, using the metaphor of a penguin that applies for a job as a welder, 
commented that adopting the Sixth Circuit approach would force the General Counsel to prove that an 
employer would hire nonunion applicants who were not qualified for jobs, which is a burden he should 
not have to meet. Id.  
 156. Id. The court noted that job matching is not required “unless and until [the Board] seeks a 
remedy on behalf of a particular worker. The worker is not the plaintiff; the Board is; and it is entitled 
to order nonmonetary relief upon proof of a violation.” Id.  
 157. Id.  
 158. Id. The court noted there was no evidence that the employer would have offered all eighty 
applicants jobs. The court went on to indicate that the Board must determine how many of the 
applicants the employer would have hired had it not been “actuated by hostility to unionization.” Id. at 
951-52.  
 159. See Ultrasystems, 18 F.3d at 259 and supra Part IV.B. 
 160. See Fluor Daniel, 161 F.3d at 969-70 and supra Part IV.C. 
 161. See supra Part IV.A. 
 162. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. In the burden-shifting scheme, the D.C. Circuit 
allowed the General Counsel to make his case on the overwhelming evidence of animus, without 
delving deeply into the failure-to-hire aspect of the case. Id. 
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Fourth163 and Seventh164 Circuits are at the center of the spectrum, 
requiring the Board to make some specific showing of animus and refusal 
to hire at least one applicant, but not any specific applicant.165 The Sixth 
Circuit,166 at the opposite end of the spectrum from the D.C. Circuit, 
requires the most from the General Counsel by requiring him to match 
applicants to job openings to make out a prima facie case.167 Thus, the 
Sixth Circuit has most closely satisfied the language168 and purpose169 of 
the NLRA.  
V. PROPOSAL: THE GENERAL COUNSEL SHOULD MAKE A PRIMA FACIE 
CASE BY MATCHING JOBS TO APPLICANTS AND A VIOLATION SHOULD BE 
REMEDIED BY OFFERING BACK PAY AND INSTATEMENT TO THOSE WHO 
WERE DISCRIMINATED AGAINST 
The Board must match applicants to job openings in analyzing the 
General Counsel’s prima facie case and then order a remedy based only on 
the applicants actually discriminated against in order to comport with the 
language and intent of the NLRA. The Board must first determine that 
salts who applied for jobs matched the job qualifications when they were 
refused an employment opportunity.170 Then, during compliance, an order 
can be entered requiring that those applicants who had been discriminated 
against be offered the same or equivalent positions as those they would 
have been hired into but for their affiliation to the union.171 Although the 
NLRB’s decisions in 2000 and 2001172 have followed the remedies 
 163. See supra Part IV.B. 
 164. See supra Part IV.D. 
 165. See supra notes 122 and 155 and accompanying text respectively. 
 166. See supra Part IV.C. 
 167. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.  
 168. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2000). 
 169. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).  
 170. This requirement would comport with the NLRA, which states, “It shall be an unfair labor 
practice for an employer . . . by discrimination in regard to hire . . . to encourage or discourage 
membership in any labor organization.” § 158(a)(3). If an employer does not hire anyone or does not 
hire an applicant because she is not qualified, it does not violate the NLRA and a prima facie case is 
not made, because the requirement of a “covered activity” has not been met. See supra Part II.B, 
discussing the Wright Line test requirements. Additionally, job matching comports with the 
McDonnell Douglas requirement that a person must be qualified for a position in order to make out a 
prima facie case. See supra note 82. 
 171. This requirement would comport with § 160(c) of the NLRA concerning the Board’s power 
to order “such [employer] to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such 
affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay . . .” 29 U.S.C. 
§ 160(c)(2000). See also supra notes 145-146 and accompanying text.  
 172. FES, supra note 19; In re Eckert Fire Prot., supra note 47 (using the test outlined in FES); 
ITT Federal Serv. Corp., 335 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 2001-2002 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 16,019 (Aug. 27, 
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recommended by the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, the NLRB still 
views as unnecessary the Sixth Circuit’s job-matching requirement to 
establish a prima facie case.173  
Because of the requirement that an applicant be qualified for a position 
in order to be a victim of discrimination, applying the McDonnell Douglas 
test would satisfy the problem of identifying an unfair labor practice in the 
NLRA context.174 The similarities in the goals,175 the elements of the 
prima facie case,176 the burden-shifting approach,177 and most notably the 
availability of drawing an inference in making a prima facie case178 make 
the adoption of the McDonnell Douglas test useful in the NRLA context. 
The FES test, as recently adopted by the Board, is not sufficient to truly 
identify an employer’s unfair labor practice. In order to make a prima facie 
case, the General Counsel must show not only antiunion animus, but also 
that a viable candidate existed who could have filled a position for which 
an employer was actually hiring. Without this requirement, the General 
Counsel could make a case simply by showing that an employer has 
antiunion animus.179 While antiunion animus may be reprehensible, it is 
simply not enough to satisfy the necessary elements of discrimination in 
hiring to comport with the requirements of the NLRA.180 Because the 
Wright Line test requires both animus and discrimination in order to show 
an employer has committed an unfair labor practice, a showing of both 
antiunion animus and refusal to hire a qualified applicant for a job that was 
2001) (outlining the test to be used under the FES formula).  
 173. In FES, the Board requested that the parties brief the issues based on the decisions in 
Ultrasystems, Fluor Daniel, and Starcon, and determined that the Starcon court presented the best 
analysis. FES, 331 N.L.R.B. at 14.  
 174. Using the McDonnell Douglas test would address the problems in determining discrimination 
in hiring described in Part II.C, of this Note. 
 175. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 176. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 177. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 178. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. Inference is a way of lowering the burden on a 
complaining party who is alleging discrimination. Using inference addresses the Starcon court’s 
concern of over-burdening the General Counsel. See supra note 155.  
 179. See Fluor Daniel, 161 F.3d at 967. “There is no interference with, restraint, or coercion of 
applicants in the exercise of their protected rights when an employer, even with anti-union animus, 
rejects applicants who are in fact unqualified or for whose particular services the employer simply has 
no need.” Id. 
 180. The NLRA indicates that an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(3) is committed 
when an employer interferes with, restrains, or coerces employees to refrain from exercising their right 
to organize, or when it commits discrimination in regard to hiring. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) & 158(a)(3). 
There can be no interference, restraint, coercion, or discrimination where there is no activity, in this 
case hiring. See Fluor Daniel, 161 F.3d at 967. See also supra Part II.B of this Note, outlining the 
Wright Line test.  
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available at the time of the alleged discrimination is required.181 The Sixth 
Circuit’s approach is therefore the closest to properly determining 
discrimination in hiring. 
The other circuits’ approaches are insufficient. The Great Lakes and 
Ultrasystems holdings are inadequate because they do not meet the 
requirements of the NLRA and they do not give an employer notice of the 
specific unfair labor practice it has committed.182 The Starcon holding 
would be sufficient when there is a mass hiring and a mass group of 
applicants who are union organizers, but it wholly fails to address a 
situation where there are limited job openings and a few applicants with 
varying qualifications. If the General Counsel can make a prima facie case 
simply by showing that at least one applicant would have been hired, and 
it does not matter which one, the burden on the employer to explain its 
hiring decision will be at least confusing and possibly onerous, 
considering all the variables involved in hiring decisions when various 
applicants have various qualifications. Additionally, in cases of mass 
hiring, the burden on the General Counsel to show at least one specific 
applicant would have been hired but for his union affiliation is slight183 
because the odds are high that at least one of the multiple applicants will 
be qualified. 
Further, the remedy in cases where an unfair labor practice has been 
proven must be specific to the number of job openings that existed at the 
time of the alleged discrimination.184 The remedy must fit the violation, no 
more.185 To force employers to hire employees for whom they have no 
work is too great a financial burden on an employer, adds a punitive 
element that is not called for by the NLRA,186 and simply does not make 
 181. See supra note 156, where the Starcon court curiously stated that the Board is the plaintiff in 
unfair labor practice cases, justifying why job matching is not required in order to make out a 
violation. This observation overlooks the fact that a violation cannot be proved until the Wright Line 
test has been met, which requires that both animus and discrimination be shown. It is unclear how, 
under the Starcon proposition, the Board could show both required elements of the prima facie case 
unless an applicant was actually discriminated against, which requires specific proof that can only be 
found by comparing actual openings to applicants.  
 182. If the Board can defer the matching of open jobs with qualified workers until after the 
determination of an unfair labor practice has been made, there could be a violation of due process. See 
Fluor Daniel, 161 F.3d at 970. See also supra note 144.  
 183. This situation mirrors Great Lakes, which shows that the animus question could overwhelm 
and swallow the discrimination issue altogether. See supra note 102-103 and accompanying text. 
 184. This would be particularly manageable if the Board matched jobs to applicants in the making 
of the prima facie case. There would be no issue about the party discriminated against in the 
compliance stage because that information would have already been ascertained. 
 185. See supra note 124, referring to Phelps Dodge, 313 U.S. 198. 
 186. See supra note 124, referring to Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 900. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss1/6
p201 Howlett note.doc 5/8/03   1:29 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2003] “SALT” IN THE WOUND? 227 
 
 
 
sense. An employer should not be forced to provide a remedy for 
something greater than the violation it committed. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Salting provides a way for labor unions to gain access to employees 
where they otherwise might not have such access.187 Because salting is a 
recognized activity,188 union organizers must be protected from 
discrimination when they seek employment from nonunion employers.189 
Nonetheless, employers should not be forced to hire salts simply because 
they know a union could disrupt their business by filing and pursuing 
unfair labor practice charges whenever the employer did not hire the 
union’s organizer applicants.190 The burden must remain on the General 
Counsel to show discrimination, which includes a showing that an 
applicant is qualified for a position, in order to pursue charges against an 
employer for refusing to hire him. 
In order to balance the burdens equitably between the parties, the 
General Counsel must be required to show both the qualifications of the 
union organizers who applied for the jobs and the employer’s antiunion 
animus in order to make a prima facie case of discrimination in hiring. To 
require less would not provide an employer notice of its alleged unfair 
labor practices.191 Job matching is not an onerous burden, and it prevents 
unions from using the Board as a tool to force employers into choosing 
between hiring applicants they otherwise may not need and facing unfair 
labor practice charges and possible litigation. 
Pamela A. Howlett*  
 
 
 187. See supra note 2. 
 188. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 189. This protection is required pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). See supra note 15 and 
accompanying text. 
 190. See supra notes 43 & 138. 
 191. See supra note 144. 
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